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Abstract: Recently several philosophers have defended an explanatory argument that 
supposedly provides novel empirical grounds for accepting the type identity theory of 
phenomenal consciousness. They claim that we are justified in believing that the type 
identity thesis is true because it provides the best explanation for the correlations between 
physical properties and phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine the actual role 
identities play in science and point out crucial shortcomings in the explanatory argument. 
I show that the supporters of the argument have failed to show that the identity thesis 
provides a satisfactory explanation for the correlations between physical and phenomenal 
properties. Hence, the explanatory argument, as it stands, does not provide new grounds 
for accepting the type identity theory.  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The relation of mental properties to physical properties has preoccupied philosophers 
throughout the history of modern philosophy of mind. Particularly problematic are 
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phenomenal properties or qualia, which apparently resist physical explanations. Type 
physicalism (also known as type identity theory, type materialism or reductive 
physicalism) is the view that mental properties, including phenomenal properties, are 
identical to physical properties. Recently several philosophers (Bates, 2009; Block & 
Stalnaker. 1999; Hill, 1991; McLaughlin, 2001, 2007, 2010; see also Melnyk, 2003) have 
advanced new positive grounds for accepting type physicalism, arguing that it provides 
the best explanation for the correlations between phenomenal and physical properties.  
In this paper, I will criticize this “explanatory argument” for the identity of 
phenomenal and physical properties. My starting point is Kim’s (2005) attack on the 
explanatory argument, and I will focus on McLaughlin’s (2007, 2010) and Bates’ (2009) 
formulation of the argument. What I will show is that neither Kim nor the supporters of 
the explanatory argument have taken sufficiently into account the actual role that 
identities and correlations play in scientific explanations. I will argue that (contra Kim) 
identities do play a crucial role in scientific explanation, but (contra the new type 
physicalists) they are not put forward as explanations for correlations of the kind that are 
involved in the case of phenomenal properties. For this reason, a crucial premise in the 
explanatory argument for type physicalism is undermined by scientific practice, and 
hence the argument fails to provide new grounds for accepting type physicalism.  
 
 
2. The explanatory argument for type physicalism 
 
A state of phenomenal consciousness is such that there is something that it is like to be in 
that state. For example, there is something it is like to be in pain, or see red, or smell 
sulphur. Phenomenal states1 are notoriously resistant to explanations in physical or neural 
terms, as several passionately debated arguments purport to show (the explanatory gap, 
Nagel’s bat, Mary in a black-and-white room, and so on).  However, it is plausible that 
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some day scientists will have discovered exactly how phenomenal states are correlated 
with neural or physical states. This can be formulated as the following correlation thesis: 
“For any type of state of phenomenal consciousness C there is a type of physical state P 
such that it is true and counterfactual supporting that a being is in C if and only if the 
being is in P” (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 267).  
The truth of the correlation thesis would not yet settle the question of the place of 
phenomenal consciousness in nature, since the thesis is compatible with various different 
ontological positions, including property dualism, neutral monism, parallelism and type 
physicalism. These positions each have their problems and virtues, which have been 
widely discussed. However, the novel strategy of the supporters of the explanatory 
argument is to take the truth of the correlation thesis as a starting point and then argue 
that we are justified in believing that type physicalism is true because it explains the 
correlation thesis, while the other ontological solutions leave it unexplained. Type 
physicalism states that (Type Physicalism): “For every type of state of phenomenal 
consciousness C, there is a type of physical state P such that C = P” (McLaughlin, 2010, 
p. 266). This indeed seems to provide a straightforward explanation for the correlation 
thesis: for each state of phenomenal consciousness, the reason why a being is in C if and 
only if the being is in P is that C = P.  In contrast, for example, (emergent) property 
dualism simply asserts that psychoneural correlations are a fundamental unexplainable 
feature of the world. 
It seems then that Type Physicalism is the best explanation for the correlation 
thesis. This follows immediately if we accept that Type Physicalism explains the 
correlation thesis while all the alternative ontological solutions do not explain it at all (or 
fail for some other reason). Finally, supporters of the argument claim that the fact that the 
identity thesis is the best explanation for the correlation thesis provides the justification 
for holding the identity thesis to be true. The idea behind this is that if we know that A is 
true and that B is the best explanation for A, then we are justified in believing B.  
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The explanatory argument can also be presented more schematically as follows 
(adapted from Bates, 2009, p. 315): 
 
P1. Correlation Thesis: For any type of state of phenomenal consciousness C 
there is a type of physical state P such that it is true and counterfactual-supporting 
that a being is in C if and only if the being is in P. 
P2. One possible explanation of the Correlation Thesis is Type Physicalism: For 
every type of state of phenomenal consciousness C, there is a type of physical 
state P such that C = P. 
P3. No alternative explanation of the Correlation Thesis is as good as Type 
Physicalism.  
Conclusion: Type Physicalism is true. 
 
3. Kim’s Objection 
 
Jaegwon Kim (2005, ch. 5) has presented several objections to the explanatory argument. 
For example, Kim argues that the very idea of correlation implies that the correlates are 
distinct, and raises doubts about the principle of inference to the best explanation. 
However, I will only discuss here the objection that I consider to be the strongest one, 
and which also provides the starting point for my own criticism. This objection states that 
psychophysical identities do not explain psychophysical correlations, or anything else for 
that matter, and hence the explanatory argument fails. According to Kim (2005), 
scientific explanations of correlations are nothing like McLaughlin and others take them 
to be:  
 
In science there seem to be two principal ways of explaining correlations: first, 
correlations are sometimes explained by invoking a single lower-level process or 
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structure underlying the correlated phenomena; second, the explanation may 
proceed by showing the correlated phenomena to be collateral effects of a 
common cause. … In any case, it is quite obvious that scientists will not in 
general attempt to explain correlations by identifying the correlated properties. (p. 
134) 
 
Before discussing these claims, it is important to note that the sense in which 
‘correlation’ is used in the explanatory argument is very different from the standard 
scientific use of the term, which is statistical correlation. This is something Kim is not 
clear enough about: talk about scientific explanations of correlations immediately brings 
into mind statistical correlations. However, the correlation thesis only says: “For any type 
of state of phenomenal consciousness C there is a type of physical state P such that it is 
true and counterfactual supporting that a being is in C if and only if the being is in P”. As 
McLaughlin (2010, p. 271) points out, it does not even involve the term correlation, 
except in the title. Therefore, it would be more accurate to talk of nomological 
copresence instead of correlation. In the rest of this paper, I mean by ‘correlation’ the 
kind of nomological copresence expressed by the correlation thesis.  
In any case, the type physicalists’ answer to this point is straightforward. They 
argue that there is a third way of explaining correlations in science, and that is by 
pointing out that the correlates are identical. According to McLaughlin (2010, p. 282), “A 
= B” can explain why A is present when and only when B is present. To support this 
claim, he provides an example: when Maxwell realized that the speed of electromagnetic 
waves in a vacuum is the speed of light, he made the “bold conjecture” that “light waves 
= electromagnetic waves.” McLaughlin argues that the identity “light waves = 
electromagnetic waves” explains why light waves are present when and only when 
electromagnetic waves are present.  
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I agree with the type physicalists that Kim has not convincingly shown that 
identities do not play any role in scientific explanations. Scientific hypotheses often 
involve identity claims, and these claims are explanatorily substantial. However, as I will 
show in the next section, I do think that Kim’s basic intuition is right: in science, 
identities are not put forward to explain correlations of the kind that the correlation thesis 
involves. For this reason, the explanatory argument fails.  
 
 
 
4. The Role of Identities in Scientific Explanation 
  
The discussion on type physicalism in philosophy of mind has traditionally focused on 
conceptual and metaphysical issues related to the nature or possibility of psychoneural 
identities. Little attention has been paid to science and the actual role identities play in 
scientific explanations. One of the positive features of the debate on the explanatory 
argument is that it is at least superficially connected to science, and both proponents and 
opponents of the argument appeal to science in support of their views, as we also saw in 
the discussion between McLaughlin and Kim above. Particularly notable is that the 
explanatory argument is presented as an (partly) empirical argument for type physicalism. 
McLaughlin explicitly claims that Type Physicalism is an empirical hypothesis, and that 
it figures in the explanation of the correlation thesis in a similar way as hypotheses in 
science figure in explanations (McLaughlin, 2010, p. 279; see also Bates, 2009, p. 320, 
and Melnyk, 2003, p. 9-10). However, the evidence from science presented in support of 
this is rather scarce. McLaughlin mainly appeals to the case that already came up in the 
previous section: the identity of light waves and electromagnetic waves. In more detail, 
McLaughlin (2010) writes: 
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When Maxwell’s calculations showed that electromagnetic waves have the same 
speed in a vacuum as the known speed of light, he famously made “the bold 
conjecture” that light waves = electromagnetic waves … The hypothesis that light 
waves are electro-magnetic waves was invoked to explain why (1) 
electromagnetic waves and light waves occur in the same spatial regions at the 
same time, why (2) electromagnetic waves have the same speed in a vacuum as 
light waves, and why (3) the refractive indices in materials are exactly the same 
for light waves and electro-magnetic waves. (p. 282) 
 
I grant that this example shows that (contra Kim) identities do play a role in scientific 
explanation. However, it does not show that identities are a way of explaining 
correlations, understood as nomological copresence. The crucial part in Maxwell’s 
argument was showing that electromagnetic waves and light waves propagate at the same 
velocity (speed of light). After considering the velocity of propagation of “magnetic 
disturbances”, Maxwell concluded that “[t]his velocity is so nearly that of light, that it 
seems that we have strong reason to conclude that light itself (including radiant heat, and 
other radiations if any) is an electromagnetic disturbance in the form of waves propagated 
through the electromagnetic field according to electromagnetic laws” (Maxwell, 1865, p. 
466).  
Importantly, the fact that light waves are present when and only when 
electromagnetic waves are present did not play a role in making (or justifying) the “bold 
hypothesis”. The identity claim was not presented to explain this correlation, and such a 
correlation alone would never have been enough to justify the bold hypothesis. It was 
presented to explain the fact that light waves and electromagnetic waves share an 
important property (the speed of propagation). Another crucial point is that Maxwell’s 
claim was a hypothesis that still had to be confirmed by further empirical tests and 
evidence. In this case, the empirical confirmation came relatively soon, as Heinrich Hertz 
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discovered in the 1880s that electromagnetic waves exhibit certain crucial properties of 
light waves, such as refraction, reflection, and interference.2  
To get a better picture of the actual role that identities play in scientific 
explanations, let us consider another example from a field somewhat closer to philosophy 
of mind, namely vision research. About 40 years ago, Barlow and Levick were studying 
the responses of ganglion cells in the cat retina at different luminance levels (Barlow & 
Levick, 1969). They discovered strangely behaving “luminance units” that were 
extremely rare (less than 1% of the retinal ganglion cell population) and responded to 
light stimuli in an unusual way: the response was sluggish, relatively straightforwardly 
related to the light intensity, and increased monotonically with increasing light intensity 
(normally the responses of retinal ganglion cells are much more complex).  
In a different line of research, a population of morphologically distinct retinal 
ganglion cells containing the photopigment melanopsin has recently been discovered in 
the mammalian retina (see Do & Yau (2010) for a review). Interestingly, these 
melanopsin-containing cells are intrinsically photosensitive – they respond to light even 
when the synaptic transmission from the normal photoreceptors (rods and cones) is 
blocked. They resemble the “luminance units” in several important ways: their response 
to light stimuli is sluggish, the relation between response and light intensity is monotonic, 
and they are also very rare (comprising about 1-3 % of the retinal ganglion cell 
population). 
Based on these common properties, it seems extremely likely that the melanopsin-
containing cells are the luminance units. However, this identity remains hypothetical, 
since it has not (yet) been shown that all the properties of luminance units are also 
exhibited by the melanopsin-containing cells (or the other way around) (Do & Yau, 
2010). Thus, this is a case of a hypothetical identity claim that is pending empirical 
confirmation.   
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These two examples (electromagnetic waves = light waves, melanopsin 
containing cells = luminance units) nicely illustrate how identities figure in scientific 
explanations. Other examples that exhibit the same pattern are easy to name. For 
example, rod cells in the retina keep signaling in fully dark conditions, and the level of 
this “dark light” was measured in the 1940s and 1950s in human psychophysical 
experiments. Later the level of quantal noise created by the photopigment (rhodopsin) 
molecules in the rod cells was measured, and it turned out to match exactly the level of 
dark light measured psychophysically.3 This led to the very plausible hypothesis that the 
quantal noise is the dark light (Schneeweis & Schnapf, 2000). One more example of this 
pattern would be the (controversial) hypothesis that the mechanism of long term 
potentiation (LTP) is the mechanism for memory consolidation (see, e.g., McGaugh, 
2000).  
Two characteristic features of these identity claims are essential in the present 
context. First, they are put forward as hypotheses to explain why two things that were 
initially believed to be distinct, or were discovered by different methods, both have the 
same or similar properties. The fact that light waves and electromagnetic waves 
propagate at the same speed and have the same refractive indices is explained by the 
hypothesis that light waves are electromagnetic waves. The fact that luminance units and 
melanopsin-containing ganglion cells react to light in the same way is explained by the 
hypothesis that luminance units are melanopsin-containing ganglion cells, and so on.  
The second feature is even more important: hypothetical identities are to be tested 
just like any other hypotheses in science, by seeing how they stand up to empirical 
evidence. One way of doing this is by testing the further hypotheses that the identity 
claim suggests. Since we know that if two things are identical, they have to have exactly 
the same properties (indiscernibility of identicals), a hypothetical identity claim 
immediately provides ways of testing itself: if A is identical with B and A has property P, 
then B also has to have property P, and so on. This is also how Maxwell’s hypothesis was 
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tested and confirmed: if light waves are electromagnetic waves, then both must have the 
same refractive indices, and this indeed turned out to be the case. 
This second point about the role of scientific identity claims is strongly supported 
by the “Heuristic Identity Theory” (HIT) approach (Burnston, Sheredos, & Bechtel, 
2011; McCauley, 2012; McCauley & Bechtel, 2001; the theory is largely based on the 
insights of William Wimsatt (1976)). The proponents of this theory argue that identities 
are not conclusions of scientific work but hypothetical premises – identity claims are the 
beginning of scientific inquiry. The principal motivation for formulating identity claims 
is their potential to advance empirical research. In particular, the role of identities is not 
to explain correlations, but to connect levels or sciences and to generate new hypotheses 
and new avenues for research. This is one crucial aspect in which identities differ from 
correlations: they suggest explanatory connections that demand further empirical 
exploration, while correlations do not. In this sense, claims about correlations and claims 
about identities are “different conceptual animals that thrive in different theoretical 
habitats” (McCauley and Bechtel, 2001, p. 754). 
 
 
5. Type Physicalism as a Hypothetical Identity 
  
We are now in a position to see how the identity claim that the proponents of the 
explanatory argument defend differs from these scientific identity claims. The type 
physicalists’ claim is that “for every type of state of phenomenal consciousness C, there 
is a type of physical state P such that C = P”. First of all, this claim differs from the 
scientific identity claims because it is not posited to explain any shared properties; it is 
posited to explain the nomological copresence of physical and phenomenal properties. 
Secondly, it differs from them because it cannot be empirically tested in the way 
scientific identity claims are – the claim does not lead to any predictions or further 
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hypotheses that could be empirically verified. Proponents of the explanatory argument 
would certainly agree that there is no further empirical evidence or tests that could 
distinguish between Type Physicalism and the other ontological positions – their claim is 
that Type Physicalism is superior based “holistic grounds of overall coherence and 
simplicity with respect to total theory” (McLaughlin, 2007, p. 436). If there was an 
empirical test or a prediction that could distinguish between the ontological alternatives, 
all this philosophical discussion would be unnecessary: we could just wait until the 
empirical results are in.4  
Hence, the identity claim of the type physicalists fundamentally differs from the 
scientific identity claims that I have discussed in the previous section. These 
considerations also point to a further problem in the explanatory argument for type 
physicalism. In all of the examples discussed, the hypothetical identity is an identity of 
things. This includes also most of the examples of successful identifications that 
McLaughlin (2010) and Bates (2009) present (Bill Sikes = the burglar, water = H2O, 
Tully = Cicero, light waves = electromagnetic waves, etc.). However, what is at issue in 
the case of psychoneural correlations and type physicalism is the identity of properties. 
The claim is that the correlation of properties is explained by the fact that the properties 
are identical.  
To be fair, the proponents of the explanatory argument do discuss one case that 
clearly involves properties – the case of mean kinetic energy and heat (e.g., Block & 
Stalnaker, 1999, p. 23-24). Furthermore, perhaps the other cases can be translated into 
talk of properties as well, for example “being water = being H2O”. However, the 
disanalogy between cases such as these and the case of phenomenal properties is well 
known and has been thoroughly discussed in philosophy of mind (Levine (1983) is one 
locus classicus). The identity of mean kinetic energy and heat is justified by the fact that 
mean kinetic energy plays the same causal role as heat, while phenomenal properties and 
physical properties do not have the same causal role (phenomenal properties resist a 
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causal analysis). Therefore, these are certainly not examples where the identity claim is 
put forward to explain the nomological copresence of the properties. 
The supporters of the explanatory argument would need to provide examples from 
science where the correlation of two properties is explained by these properties being 
identical, but such examples are hard to find. It is not a common explanatory strategy in 
science to explain the copresence of properties by hypothesizing that they are identical. In 
fact, it is generally the case that correlated properties are not identical (see also Towl, 
2012, who discusses the different ways neuroscientists can explain correlations without 
appealing to identities). Consider for example the property of having a heart and the 
property of having a circulatory system. An organism has a heart if and only if it also has 
a circulatory system. However, explaining this correlation with the hypothetical identity 
“the property of having a heart = the property of having a circulatory system” would be 
deeply mistaken.5 Another everyday example of nomologically copresent properties that 
are not identical is being a three-dimensional object and having a volume: the property of 
being a three-dimensional object is present when and only when the property of having a 
volume is present. To take a physical example, having a half-integer spin is 
nomologically copresent with being a fermion, but having a half-integer spin is not 
identical to being a fermion. It seems that when two properties are systematically 
correlated, but do not have anything else in common (such as their causal role), there are 
good reasons to assume that the properties in question are not identical.  
One could argue that phenomenal properties and physical properties do share one 
property, namely their spatio-temporal location. However, this does not bring the case 
any closer to the scientific cases I have discussed in the previous section. Even if we 
accept that spatio-temporal location is a property, the main point holds: scientists do not 
posit identities merely to explain shared spatio-temporal location. This is supported by 
the several examples mentioned above, where properties that have the same spatio-
temporal location and are nomologically copresent are not identical (e.g., the property of 
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being a fermion and the property of having a half-integer spin).  If spatio-temporal 
location counts as a property, we merely have to reformulate the claim: if two properties 
are systematically correlated and the only property they share is their spatio-temporal 
location, there are good reasons to assume that the properties are not identical.  
These considerations cast serious doubts on the central premise of the explanatory 
argument, namely the assumption that the identity thesis (Type Physicalism) provides the 
best explanation for the correlation thesis. If we make the plausible assumption that 
identity claims in philosophy should at least remotely resemble identity claims in science, 
or that the requirements for an explanatory identity claim are similar in philosophy as in 
science, then it seems that Type Physicalism is not an explanatory identity claim. Since 
the type physicalists have not provided a single example from science where the 
copresence of properties is explained by those properties being identical, it is not at all 
clear that one possible scientific explanation for the correlation thesis is Type 
Physicalism. In any case, the burden of proof is on the supporters of the explanatory 
argument to show why we should consider Type Physicalism to be a satisfactory 
explanation for the nomological copresence of phenomenal and physical properties.  
In response to this, type physicalists might claim that there is a straightforward 
and intuitively clear sense in which identities can explain correlations. For example, it 
does seem intuitively quite plausible that the fact that water is present when and only 
when H2O is present is explained by the hypothesis that water is H2O (see also 
McLaughlin, 2010, p. 283-284). However, when considering intuitions like this, it is 
crucial to distinguish between two epistemic situations: (1) the epistemic situation where 
we already know that water is H2O, and (2) the imaginary epistemic situation where we 
do not yet know that water is H2O; we know only that water is nomologically copresent 
with H2O. In the first situation, it is not clear whether the idea of explaining the 
copresence of water and H2O even makes sense – the question why water and H2O are 
copresent will never arise. In any case, the explanation will at best be shallow and trivial; 
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it will not increase our understanding of the world. In the second situation, which 
resembles the case of phenomenal and physical properties, we are at best warranted to 
make the hypothesis that water is H2O, and this hypothesis needs to be confirmed by 
further research. The hypothesis is only the starting point for inquiry into the nature of 
water and H2O. It explains the correlation between water and H2O, if at all, in a shallow 
and preliminary way. Therefore, examples or intuition pumps like these do not provide 
support for the explanatory argument.  
One might try to move the discussion to a more general level and claim that, in 
spite of all that has been said, the psychophysical correlations do count as scientific 
evidence in support of Type Physicalism. This may well be true, but it does not 
undermine my criticism in any way. The explanatory argument requires that Type 
Physicalism is the best explanation the correlation thesis, and this is something very 
different from psychophysical correlations conferring evidence for Type Physicalism. 
One might also claim that Type Physicalism is the philosophically least problematic 
ontological solution to the problem of phenomenal properties. Again, this may very well 
be true, but it is beside the point, since the explanatory argument is supposed to be a new 
and empirical argument for Type Physicalism.  
It is also important to note that the proponents of HIT explicitly apply their theory 
to the case of consciousness, arguing that hypothesizing identities between conscious 
states and neural states is a reasonable research strategy that leads towards a kind of type 
identity theory (McCauley and Bechtel, 2001, p. 752-757). However, this approach is 
very different from the best explanation strategy, since McCauley and Bechtel do not 
accept the correlation thesis as a starting point or as something that is in need of 
explanation: they claim that construing neuroscientific accounts of consciousness in 
terms of correlations is a misguided approach. Therefore, the main argument of this paper 
does not apply to the HIT account of consciousness.6  
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In general, it is important to emphasize that I do not claim to have refuted Type 
Physicalism. In fact, I have presented no argument against it. The only aim of this paper 
is to point out a crucial shortcoming in one recently popular argument for Type 
Physicalism, namely the explanatory argument.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the explanatory argument for Type Physicalism is not 
supported by the role of identity claims in science. Scientists do present identities as 
explanatory hypotheses, but not in a way that the explanatory argument requires. In 
science, an identity claim is typically the starting point for further research, and 
motivated by shared properties, not mere correlations. The supporters of the explanatory 
argument have so far failed to show why and how Type Physicalism would provide a 
scientific explanation for the correlations between phenomenal and physical properties.  
In this light, the premise P2 (“One possible explanation for the correlation thesis 
is Type Physicalism”) of the explanatory argument can be questioned. Furthermore, even 
if we grant that this premise holds, the considerations in this paper cast serious doubts on 
the explanatory argument. The core of the argument is that we are justified to believe that 
Type Physicalism is true for the reason that no alternative explanation of the 
psychoneural correlations is as good as Type Physicalism. An inference to the best 
explanation of this kind is not at all straightforward or unproblematic. As Lipton (2000) 
points out, “inference to the best explanation” must generally be glossed as “inference to 
the best of the available competing explanations, when the best one is sufficiently good”. 
In the present case, the question whether the best explanation is sufficiently good is 
particularly pressing, considering the issues I have raised above. If even the best 
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explanation available is problematic or shallow, which seems to be the situation in this 
case, then an inference to the best explanation is not warranted.   
To conclude: the burden of proof is on the type physicalists to show how the 
identity thesis explains the correlation thesis, and why this explanation is sufficiently 
good to warrant an inference to the best explanation. As it stands, the explanatory 
argument gives us no new empirical grounds to accept Type Physicalism.  
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Later in the paper I mostly talk of properties instead of states. For example, 
phenomenal properties can be seen as the qualitative characters of phenomenal states. 
Nothing substantial turns on this distinction.  
2. The fact that Maxwell’s theory (including the identity of light waves and 
electromagnetic waves) was still considered a hypothesis that was in need of 
confirmation, and that Hertz himself saw his work as exactly this kind of confirmation, is 
nicely illustrated by the following quote (Hertz, 1893, p. 19-20): “From the outset 
Maxwell’s theory excelled all others in elegance and in the abundance of the relations 
between the various phenomena which it included. The probability of this theory, and 
therefore the number of its adherents, increased from year to year. But as long as 
Maxwell’s theory depended solely upon the probability of its results, and not on the 
certainty of its hypotheses, it could not completely displace the theories which were 
opposed to it. The fundamental hypotheses of Maxwell’s theory contradicted the usual 
views, and did not rest upon the evidence of decisive experiments. In this connection we 
can best characterize the object and the result of our experiments by saying: The object of 
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these experiments was to test the fundamental hypotheses of the Faraday-Maxwell 
theory, and the result of the experiments is to confirm the fundamental hypotheses of the 
theory.” 
3. Interestingly, in all of these cases, what initially motivates the hypothetical identity is 
the similarity of a certain quantitatively measurable property (speed of propagation, 
pattern of response, or level of signaling). The likelihood that the hypothesis is true then 
partly depends on how precisely this property can be measured. If the quantities match 
exactly when measured precisely, this is very strong evidence in favor of the hypothetical 
identity. In the case of the speed of propagation of light waves and electromagnetic 
waves, the measurements that Maxwell had at his disposal had large margins of error, 
which was one reason why the hypothesis needed further testing. Similarly, in the case of 
luminance units and melanopsin-containing ganglion cells, the response patterns have at 
present time not yet been measured or quantified precisely enough to confirm the 
hypothetical identity (Do & Yau, 2010, p. 1552).  
4. It is important to remember that the issue concerns phenomenal properties, which resist 
causal analyses. There may very well be ways of empirically testing various ontological 
hypotheses regarding non-phenomenal mental properties, which can be causally or 
functionally defined.  
5. Admittedly, it is not entirely clear whether it is counterfactual supporting that the 
property of having a heart is present when and only when the property of having a 
circulatory system is present. This depends on how exactly the example is construed and 
what kinds of counterfactuals need to be considered. However, the other examples (being 
three-dimensional <-> having a volume, being a fermion <-> having a half integer spin) 
are clearly counterfactual supporting.  
6. However, when it comes to phenomenal consciousness, some of the issues I have 
raised also concern the HIT approach. I have pointed out that the case of phenomenal 
consciousness does not resemble the situations where hypothetical identities are posited 
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in science. What then justifies the hypothetical identity of phenomenal and neural 
properties? What are the new hypotheses and avenues of research that this identity 
discloses? What are the further tests that could confirm or disconfirm the identity claim? 
Perhaps the problem lies in the way phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal 
properties have been traditionally construed in this debate, which is something supporters 
of HIT need not accept. In any case, these points clearly call for a more detailed 
discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
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